

ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Issue: *Sociability, Responsibility, and Criminality: From Lab to Law***Individualistic and social motives for justice judgments**

Jan-Willem van Prooijen

VU University Amsterdam and the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Address for correspondence: Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands. j.w.van.prooijen@vu.nl

Justice judgments are subjective by nature, and are influenced substantially by motivational processes. In the present contribution, two motives underlying justice judgments are examined: individualistic motives to evaluate solutions to social problems that benefit the self in material or immaterial ways as fair versus social motives to conceptualize justice in terms of the well-being of others, such as a desire for equality, adherence to in-group norms, and a concern for the collective interest. A review of relevant research reveals evidence for both motivations when people make evaluations of justice. Moreover, which motive is most dominant in the justice judgment process depends on perceptual salience: whereas individualistic motives are activated when a perceiver's own needs and goals are perceptually salient, social motives are activated when others' needs and goals are perceptually salient. It is concluded that both individualistic and social motives contribute in predictable ways to justice judgments.

Keywords: justice judgments; individualistic motives; social motives; fairness

Introduction

People care deeply about justice: the extent to which people experience social situations as fair or unfair has a strong impact on their perceptions, emotions, and behaviors. For instance, research indicates that the extent to which people feel treated fairly or unfairly by others impacts their self-esteem, their satisfaction with life, their task performance, and their cooperativeness.^{1,2} But besides the concern that perceivers themselves are treated fairly, people are also concerned that others are treated fairly. For instance, the perception that others are profiting in an unfair way from collective resources instigates an urge to punish the wrongdoer, even at the expense of one's own material interests.³ Moreover, people are willing to exert effort to repair the harm that was caused by an injustice by compensating the victims.⁴ People's concern for justice thus influences a wide range of responses, in situations where they themselves are the target of fair or unfair treatment, and in situations where one perceives how others are treated fairly or unfairly.

Justice is in the eye of the beholder, however, which means that justice judgments are often highly

subjective in nature. As such, a central question in the psychology of justice is what underlying motivational processes lead people to evaluate social situations as fair or unfair. One possibility is that justice judgments are largely inspired by individualistic motivations. This proposition conceptualizes justice judgments as the result of self-serving processes, which is closely related to the classic economic view of human behavior as being motivated by egocentric goals.⁵ Such egocentric goals may influence justice judgments in the sense that people are prone to evaluate solutions to social problems that benefit the self in material or immaterial ways as fair solutions. Another possibility, however, is that justice judgments are largely inspired by social motivations such that the needs and goals of others are part of a perceiver's reasoning about justice. This proposition conceptualizes justice judgments as a result of other-oriented motivations, in which people evaluate the fairness of social situations or interactions to the extent that they address concerns about egalitarianism, group harmony, or protection of the well-being of others. This perspective thus assumes that justice judgments are shaped by

other-oriented concerns such as equality and the collective interest.

Both types of motivation are indispensable elements of justice judgments, and evidence for both motivations can be found in the research literature. At the same time, there may be substantial differences in the extent to which either motive is most dominant in shaping justice judgments across individuals and situations. Although an elaborate overview is beyond the purposes of the present contribution, my aim is to illuminate both motives, and to delineate the processes that determine which of these motives is most dominant in shaping justice judgments. The main line of reasoning that is put forward here is that when situations elicit justice reasoning, there may be substantial differences in the perceptual salience of own versus other's needs and interests. In some social contexts, people may be mostly focused on their own needs, for instance, because one is the direct target of unfair treatment, or simply because one lacks information about how comparable others were treated. Those self-focused situations activate a mental framework that processes and evaluates social information in an egocentric fashion, which results in an individualistic motivation underlying justice judgments. But in other situations, people may be relatively more focused on other people's needs and interests, for instance, when these others receive unfair outcomes that are hard to justify, or when perceiving an event from the perspective of an independent observer who has no apparent self-interest at stake. These other-focused situations induce a style of reasoning that is more sensitive to empathic concern and in-group norms, producing justice judgments that are socially motivated.

This general theoretical framework allows for more specific predictions of how certain situational and personality variables influence reasoning about justice in a variety of situations. Specifically, perceptual salience of own versus other's needs may be influenced by relatively subtle external cues, such as the extent to which norms about individualism or collectivism are activated, or whether one is in the presence of fellow in-group members or competitive out-group members. Moreover, people may differ by disposition in the extent to which they are self- or other-focused, leading them to pay attention to different types of social cues. Perceptual salience of own versus other's needs can thus be shaped by

situational cues, personality variables, or an interaction between the person and the situation. This, in turn, may influence justice-based judgments in various settings, such as when evaluating the fairness of outcome distributions, the quality of social decision making, or when determining the appropriate severity of punishment for offenders. In the following, I will illuminate these complex dynamics by reviewing some of the evidence for both individualistic and social motivations for justice judgments, in turn.

Individualistic motives for justice judgments

The idea that justice judgments are substantially motivated by individualism is based on insights regarding the inherently egocentric nature of human perception. When people perceive their social world and process the information that they derive from it, they directly experience their own perspective but must make inferences (and exert mental effort) to understand the perspective of someone else.⁶ Even when people engage in such efforts to understand the perspective of others, they at least partially do so by adjusting from their own perspective.⁷ Such egocentric perception has substantial implications for justice judgments. People often evaluate moral stimuli as positive or negative without much conscious deliberation.^{8,9} When filtered through an individual's egocentric perceptual lens, this positive or negative valence transforms into a justice judgment that is based on the extent to which an event is positive or negative to the self.^{10,11} The implication of this is that in many situations, justice judgments are egocentrically biased, presumably to a larger extent than people realize when they evaluate how fair or unfair a situation is.

Various studies support such individualism in justice judgments, particularly in situations where the perceivers' own interests are at stake.¹² For instance, in a classic study, participants rated the fairness of payment distributions between self and other.¹³ Participants were asked to imagine how they and another person worked various numbers of hours for a professor, specifying three conditions (the participant worked 10 h and the other 7 h; versus the participant worked 7 h and the other 10 h; versus both the participant and the other worked 10 h). Moreover, they were asked to evaluate the fairness of payment in a variety of estimation tasks

(e.g., participants rated what payment for them would be fair assuming that the other received a payment of \$25). In this relatively complex distribution setting, people's justice judgments turned out to be biased toward overpaying themselves. Such individualism in justice judgments can have detrimental consequences in a variety of social situations, such as negotiations: When negotiating parties differ fundamentally in their perceptions of what outcome would be fair, it is hard to reach an agreement that is satisfactory to all parties involved.¹⁴

Besides individualism in the perceived fairness of material outcomes (i.e., distributive justice), additional evidence suggests that individualistic motives also contribute to perceptions of procedural justice, that is, the perceived fairness of decision-making procedures. An example of a typical procedural justice phenomenon is the effects of voice: people evaluate procedures in which decision-makers allow them an opportunity to voice their opinion as more fair than procedures that deny them such an opportunity.¹⁵ Moreover, these voice effects are driven by concerns beyond influencing the outcomes of the decision-making process: people evaluate voice procedures more positively even when it is clear that one's opinions cannot influence the final decision.¹⁶ Specifically, voice procedures are valued also for noninstrumental reasons: when a leader asks for a subordinate's opinions on important decisions, it communicates that the subordinate has high status and is respected as a full member of the community. Importantly, such indicators of relational worth themselves constitute valuable commodities that people receive from others, and hence, people can be egocentrically motivated to strive for these relational outcomes. Individualistic motives for justice thus do not need to be restricted to the egoistic pursuit of tangible outcomes only, but may be extended to obtaining nontangible outcomes such as respect and status, as these have implications for a perceiver's own sense of self-worth.

Preliminary evidence that procedural justice judgments are sometimes shaped by individualistic motives was obtained in a business simulation experiment testing the idea that people sometimes evaluate a minor procedural injustice that happens to the self as worse than a major procedural injustice that one sees happening to someone else.¹⁷ Groups of three participants received a voice or a no-voice procedure following various tasks on three sepa-

rate occasions. In a concentrated injustice condition, one participant received a no-voice procedure on all three occasions and the other two participants received a voice procedure on all three occasions. In a distributed injustice condition, every participant received a no-voice procedure on one occasion and voice procedures on the other two occasions. Results revealed that participants who continuously received voice in the concentrated injustice condition evaluated the supervisor's behavior as fairer than participants in the distributed injustice condition. These results suggest that the personal experience of a relatively mild procedural injustice (as was the case in the distributed injustice condition) is considered as less fair than a relatively major procedural injustice that one observes happening to someone else (as was the case in the concentrated injustice condition). Other studies confirm that people respond differently to the injustice that they experience themselves versus the injustice that they perceive happening to others.¹⁸

Besides such an asymmetry in how people weigh no-voice procedures accorded to self and others in their justice judgments, additional studies suggest that an individualistic mindset makes people more responsive to the extent to which they themselves were allowed or denied voice in a decision-making process. Specifically, a common distinction in levels of self-definition is the individual versus the social self.¹⁹ The individual self is the part of the self-concept that highlights how one is unique compared to others, which likely drives the extent to which one's own needs are salient. The social self is the part of the self-concept that focuses on similarities between the self and others, which is likely to increase the salience of others' needs. These various levels of self-definition can be made more or less accessible by means of contextual influences, such as priming procedures.²⁰ An example of a priming procedure has participants read a brief description of a trip to the city that is written in the first person singular, using words such as I, me, or myself (the individual self condition), or in the first person plural, using words such as we, our, or ourselves (the social self-condition). The participant's task then is to count all the personal pronouns in the text. Research reveals that a subsequent manipulation of voice versus no-voice procedures exerts stronger effects on participants' evaluations of how respectful and polite they feel treated after being primed

with the individual self rather than the social self.²¹ Activating an individualistic mindset thus makes people more responsive to the extent to which others treat them with fair or unfair decision-making procedures. This finding is consistent with the more general theoretical notion that justice judgments are individualistically motivated when perceivers themselves are treated with fair or unfair decision-making procedures.

Whereas subtle contextual cues may induce temporary activation of the individual or social self, a more chronic indicator of individualistic or social behavioral tendencies can be found in the personality variable of social value orientation. Social value orientation distinguishes between three categories: prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations. Prosocials are defined in terms of enhancing collective outcomes and equality in outcomes between themselves and others; individualists are defined in terms of enhancing outcomes for self with no or very little regard for other's outcomes; and competitors are defined in terms of enhancing relative advantage over others.²² The individualistic and competitive orientations are often combined into a single category of pro-self-orientation, because both seek to enhance own outcomes, either in an absolute sense (individualists) or in a relative or comparative sense (competitors).²³ It stands to reason that people with a pro-self orientation are more likely than people with a prosocial orientation to pay close attention to, and hence be responsive to, self-relevant social information. Consistent with the idea that justice judgments are individualistically motivated when one is the target of fair or unfair treatment, research reveals that providing participants with voice versus no-voice procedures exerts a strong influence on procedural justice judgments only among proselves, and not among prosocials. These findings were independent from the expected outcomes of the decision-making process. Moreover, these results were found not only in laboratory experiments and in samples of university students, but also in organizations.¹¹ People who are chronically self-focused, thus, are most responsive to variations in procedural justice.

In sum, individualistic motives clearly contribute to justice judgments. These motives can be observed in the distribution of material outcomes, as well as when evaluating decision-making procedures.

These individualistic motives seem to emerge particularly in situations where the individual's own—tangible or nontangible—interests are perceptually salient, such as decision-making contexts where the perceiver's own payment is at stake, or where the perceiver is accorded a voice or a no-voice procedure. In the following section, I will describe conditions under which motives for justice are more likely of a social nature, due to dispositional or situational factors that increase the perceptual salience of other's needs.

Social motives for justice judgments

Although individualistic motives may be part of the psychology of justice, it is unlikely that they are entirely responsible for driving justice judgments. In many situations, people seem genuinely motivated by moral norms and concerns about equality, sometimes at the expense of their own interests. As a case in point, individualistic strivings for outcome maximization, status, and respect are hard to reconcile with the personal sacrifices that historical figures such as Mohandas Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Mother Teresa made in the pursuit of justice. These individuals seemed to conceptualize justice in terms of the needs and interests of other people. Indeed, the main proposition here is that when others' needs are perceptually salient, justice-based reasoning is motivated by social concerns. For instance, whereas overpayment of the self is mainly found in relatively complex decision-making contexts where one is able to psychologically justify striving for a relatively high reward,^{13,14} people prefer equity in a relatively simple distribution context where it is clear that relative overpayment is unfair toward others.²⁴ Furthermore, research on economic games reveals that distributors share valuable resources in a more egalitarian way with receivers that are completely powerless (e.g., a dictator game, where the receiver has to accept any offer from the distributor), as opposed to receivers that have some, but very low, retaliation power (e.g., a modified ultimatum game where the receiver can punish an unfair offer by only a very minor subtraction of the distributor's outcomes). These results were attributable to the social responsibility norms that are activated when faced with a powerless other.²⁵ Subtle contextual cues can apparently focus a perceiver's attention to the needs of others, eliciting justice-based reasoning that is driven by social motivations.

In many situations, personality traits—notably, social value orientation—may also determine the extent to which a perceiver is concerned about own versus others' needs, and hence, whether justice judgments are grounded in individualistic or social motives. Whereas the justice judgments of proselves in particular are influenced by the extent to which they themselves are accorded a voice or a no-voice procedure,¹¹ a different pattern emerges in an evaluation context where a perceiver also has information about how a comparable other participant is treated. In such situations, proselves base justice judgments mostly on the extent to which they themselves receive a voice or a no-voice procedure, regardless of how the other participant is treated; but prosocials base justice judgments mostly on equality in procedures, that is, whether they received the same procedures as the other participant.²⁶ These findings suggest that in the same social comparison context, procedural justice judgments can be based on either individualistic or social motives depending on the social value orientation of the perceiver.

Given the assumed role of perceptual salience of own versus other's needs, it stands to reason that social motives become increasingly important in justice judgments to the extent that perceivers are less actively involved in an event. For instance, if one is an observer who is confronted with an event where another individual or group is victimized by the unfair behavior of another actor, the observer's scope of attention may—at least temporarily—be less focused on his or her own egocentric goals. As such, most justice-based reasoning that emerges among independent observers is likely to be based on motivations beyond egocentrism, such as collective needs, the desire to uphold moral norms, or the well-being of a victim of injustice. Various studies underscore that people are willing to pay in order to punish an unknown actor who behaved unfairly toward an unknown victim, even when there is no clear self-serving incentive to do so.²⁷ These findings have been interpreted as indication that people sometimes actively pursue justice for the sake of justice, even at the cost of personal gains. Independent observers thus are sometimes willing to sacrifice individualistic goals (i.e., personal gains) to restore a sense of justice for others, underscoring the social motivations for justice in these situations.

Many studies on the punishment of unfair actors have been conducted from an independent observer perspective, where participants simply indicate punitive preferences instead of being allowed to actively punish the offender. Typically, participants receive a scenario in the format of a newspaper article, in which they read how an offender commits an injustice harming a victim, and then respond to questions assessing punishment preferences, negative emotions, and perceptions of the offender and victim. Such a setup thus mimics lay people's responses to the injustices that they perceive on a day-to-day basis through modern media. One set of studies reveals that activation of the social self increases desire to punish the offender.²⁸ Thus, whereas activating an individualistic mindset makes people more sensitive to personally experienced injustice,²¹ activation of a social mindset makes people more sensitive to injustice experienced by others. Additional findings reveal that activation of the social self also shapes justice-based reactions to crime victims.²⁹

It is important to note that social motivations are not necessarily benevolent motivations, as the scope of out-groups that are considered worthy of fair treatment tends to vary across situations.³⁰ Rather, it implies that people conceptualize justice in terms of in-group norms or behavior that serves the collective interest, but sometimes this may be harmful to the interest of other individuals or groups. For instance, in a group-based setting, people often conceptualize justice as behavior that benefits their own group, even at the expense of other groups.³¹ Moreover, people endorse differential punishment depending on whether the offender belongs to the in-group or an out-group. Specifically, two opposing patterns are typically found when comparing punishment for in-group and out-group offenders who committed the same offense: people sometimes have a stronger desire to punish an in-group offender, due to a motivation to protect their group's reputation and uphold in-group norms by symbolically excluding the offender (the black sheep effect).³² But at other times, people have a stronger desire to punish an out-group offender, as, for instance, reflected in racial bias in sentencing.³³ Which of these effects emerge depends on what is best for a perceiver's own group in a specific social context. When the evidence against a defendant is strong,

people serve their group best by endorsing strong punishment for the in-group offender, as displaying strong disapproval helps to restore the harm done to the group's image by the offender's behavior; but when the evidence against a defendant is weak, people consider guilt more likely for an out-group as opposed to in-group suspect, as they are loyal to, and deny blame for, one of their group members.^{34,35} While the justice system is ostensibly blind with regard to social categories in legal proceedings, in reality, people recommend differential punishment of offenders depending on their group membership. This unequal application of justice emerges out of social motivations, in this case, a desire to protect the in-group.

In sum, motivations for justice cannot be only individualistic but also social, in the sense that they are based on concerns about the needs and interests of others. These social motivations are most likely to inspire justice judgments when the needs of others are perceptually salient, which may be caused by chronic features of a perceiver's personality (i.e., prosocials), or by features of the situation that decrease the emphasis on own goals and interests. However, these social motives may be selective, in the sense that they mainly serve the needs of others that are part of a perceiver's social identity or group, while ignoring the needs of others who are more remote from a perceiver's identity. Neither individualistic nor social motives thus guarantee an equal application of justice.

Concluding remarks

The present contribution was designed to highlight the subjectivity of justice judgments by pointing out how basic motivational dynamics shape these judgments across social situations. Instead of forming justice judgments from "behind the veil of ignorance"—which, according to the philosopher John Rawls,³⁶ is a prerequisite for a truly objective application of justice—the findings reviewed here suggest that what people consider to be fair depends largely on their self- or other-oriented goals, and the extent to which these goals are activated through perceptual salience of own versus others' needs. If people are mainly focused on their own needs—due to personality or the demands of the situation—justice judgments are likely to be influenced by individualistic motivations, producing evaluations that

are based on the valence of anticipated outcomes for the self. But if people are mainly focused on others' needs, justice judgments are likely to be influenced by social motivations such as in-group norms and the collective interest. Moreover, these ideas can be applied to understand multiple conceptualizations of justice, including the distribution of material outcomes (i.e., distributive justice), the perceived fairness of decision-making procedures (i.e., procedural justice), and the application of punishment to offenders (i.e., retributive justice).

The present contribution was conceptualized by the broad dichotomous distinction of own versus other's needs. Future theorizing and research may disentangle more specific needs in relation to justice judgments. For instance, it has been shown that a need for autonomy—presumably an individualistic psychological need—influences reasoning about justice when the perceiver is treated with fair or unfair decision-making procedures.³⁷ Although this finding is consistent with the arguments raised here, it does illuminate avenues toward more specificity regarding the underlying motivations that shape justice judgments in various situations. Various other studies confirm relations between specific psychological needs and justice concerns.^{38–40} As such, the arguments presented here may be a step toward a more refined theoretical model that centers around the question of how specific psychological needs motivate justice judgments.

It is unlikely that people are always aware of the influence of the proposed motivational forces on their justice judgments. People may mostly be inclined to believe that their justice judgments are inspired by social motivations such as moral norms and concern for others. After all, people have the desire to believe that they are moral, or at least to be perceived as such.⁴¹ But these attributions of social motives to an individual's own justice judgments may be justified only in a limited number of situations, and on many occasions—particularly when there are substantial self-relevant implications to a social interaction—justice judgments are influenced by individualistic motives, more than people may realize. It is concluded that both individualistic and social motives are fundamental to explain why people are so strongly concerned about justice in many aspects of their everyday lives.

Conflicts of interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

References

1. De Cremer, D. & T.R. Tyler. 2005. Managing group behavior: the interplay between fairness, self, and cooperation. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. M. Zanna, Ed.: 151–218. New York: Academic Press.
2. Tyler, T.R. & S.L. Blader. 2003. The group engagement model: procedural justice, social identity, and cooperative behavior. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev.* **7**: 349–361.
3. Fehr, E. & S. Gächter. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. *Nature* **415**: 137–140.
4. Darley, J.M. & T.S. Pittman. 2003. The psychology of compensatory and retributive justice. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev.* **7**: 324–336.
5. Mueller, D.C. 1986. Rational egoism vs. adaptive egoism. *Public Choice* **51**: 3–23.
6. Caruso, E.M., N. Epley & M.H. Bazerman. 2006. The costs and benefits of undoing egocentric responsibility assessments in groups. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **91**: 857–871.
7. Epley, N., B. Keysar, L. Van Boven & T. Gilovich. 2004. Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **87**: 327–339.
8. Haidt, J. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgments. *Psychol. Rev.* **108**: 814–834.
9. Miller, G. 2008. The roots of morality. *Science* **320**: 734–737.
10. Epley, N. & E.M. Caruso. 2004. Egocentric ethics. *Soc. Justice Res.* **17**: 171–188.
11. Van Prooijen, J.-W., D. De Cremer, I. Van Beest, *et al.* 2008. The egocentric nature of procedural justice: social value orientation as moderator of reactions to decision-making procedures. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **44**: 1303–1315.
12. Ham, J.R.C. & K. van den Bos. 2008. Not fair for me! The influence of personal relevance on social justice inferences. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **44**: 699–705.
13. Messick, D.M. & K.P. Sentsis. 1979. Fairness and preference. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **15**: 418–434.
14. Babcock, L. & G. Loewenstein. 1997. Explaining bargaining impasse: the role of self-serving biases. *J. Econ. Perspect.* **11**: 109–126.
15. Folger, R. 1977. Distributive and procedural justice: combined impact of “voice” and improvement on experienced inequity. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **35**: 108–119.
16. Lind, E.A., R. Kanfer & P.C. Earley. 1990. Voice, control, and procedural justice: instrumental and noninstrumental concerns in fairness judgments. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **59**: 952–959.
17. Lind, E. A., L. Kray & L. Thompson. 1998. The social construction of injustice: fairness judgments in response to own and others’ unfair treatment by authorities. *Org. Behav. Hum. Dec.* **75**: 1–22.
18. Van Prooijen, J.-W., K. Van den Bos, E. A. Lind & H.A.M. Wilke. 2006. How do people react to negative procedures? On the moderating role of authority’s biased attitudes. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **42**: 632–645.
19. Gaertner, L., C. Sedikides, J.L. Vevea & J. Iuzzini. 2002. The “I,” the “we,” and the “when”: a meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **83**: 574–591.
20. Brewer, M.B. & W. Gardner. 1996. Who is this “we”? Levels of collective identity and self representations. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **71**: 83–93.
21. Van Prooijen, J.-W. & F. Zwenk. 2009. Self-construal level and voice procedures: the individual self as psychological basis for procedural fairness effects. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **45**: 392–397.
22. Van Lange, P.A.M. 1999. The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: an integrative model of social value orientation. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **77**: 337–349.
23. De Cremer, D. & P.A.M. Van Lange. 2001. Why prosocials exhibit greater cooperation than proselves: the roles of social responsibility and reciprocity. *Eur. J. Personality* **15**: S5–S18.
24. Adams, J.S. 1965. Inequity in social exchange. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. Vol. 2. L. Berkowitz, Ed.: 267–299. New York: Academic Press.
25. Handgraaf, M.J.J., E. Van Dijk, R.C. Vermunt, *et al.* 2008. Less power or powerless? Egocentric empathy gaps and the irony of having little versus no power in social decision making. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **95**: 1136–1149.
26. Van Prooijen, J.-W., T. Ståhl, D. Eek & P.A.M. Van Lange. 2012. Injustice for all or just for me? Social value orientation predicts responses to own versus other’s procedures. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. B.* **38**: 1247–1258.
27. Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch & R.H. Thaler. 1986. Fairness and the assumptions of economics. *J. Bus.* **59**: S285–S300.
28. Gollwitzer, M. & K. Bücklein. 2007. Are “we” more punitive than “me”? Self-construal styles, justice-related attitudes, and punitive judgments. *Soc. Justice Res.* **20**: 457–478.
29. Van Prooijen, J.-W. & K. Van den Bos. 2009. We blame innocent victims more than I do: self-construal level moderates responses to just-world threats. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. B.* **35**: 1528–1539.
30. Laham, S.M. 2009. Expanding the moral circle: inclusion and exclusion mindsets and the circle of moral regard. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **45**: 250–253.
31. Wildschut, T., B. Pinter, J.L. Vevea, *et al.* 2003. Beyond the group mind: a quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. *Psychol. Bull.* **129**: 698–722.
32. Marques, J.M. & D. Paez. 1994. The ‘black sheep effect’: social categorization, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. In *European Review of Social Psychology*. Vol. 5. W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone, Eds.: 37–68. New York: Wiley.
33. Graham, S., B. Weiner & G.S. Zucker. 1997. An attributional analysis of punishment goals and public reactions to O. J. Simpson. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. B* **23**: 331–346.
34. Kerr, N.L., R.W. Hymes, A.B. Anderson & J.E. Weathers. 1995. Defendant-juror similarity and mock juror judgments. *Law Human Behav.* **19**: 545–567.
35. Van Prooijen, J.-W. 2006. Retributive reactions to suspected offenders: the importance of social categorizations and guilt probability. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. B* **32**: 715–726.
36. Rawls, J. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

37. Van Prooijen, J.-W. 2009. Procedural justice as autonomy regulation. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **96**: 1166–1180.
38. De Cremer, D., L. Brebels & C. Sedikides. 2008. Being uncertain about what? Procedural fairness effects as a function of general uncertainty and belongingness uncertainty. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **44**: 1520–1525.
39. Blader, T.R. & T.R. Tyler. 2009. Testing and extending the group engagement model: linkages between social identity, procedural justice, economic outcomes, and extrarole behavior. *J. Appl. Psychol.* **94**: 445–464.
40. Van den Bos, K. 2009. Making sense of life: the existential self trying to deal with personal uncertainty. *Psychol. Inq.* **20**: 197–217.
41. Jordan, A.H. & B. Monin. 2008. From sucker to saint: moralization in response to self-threat. *Psychol. Sci.* **19**: 809–815.