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## Reports

Self-construal level and voice procedures: The individual self as psychological basis for procedural fairness effects<sup>☆</sup>Jan-Willem van Prooijen<sup>\*</sup>, Frederike Zwenk

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## ABSTRACT

In the current article, we investigate the influence of self-construal level on procedural fairness effects, that is, the finding that fair versus unfair procedures influence people's evaluations of their relation with decision-making authorities. In two experiments, we manipulated self-construal level by activating the individual self ("I") or the social self ("We"), and we induced a control condition. Furthermore, we manipulated procedural fairness by granting versus denying participants an opportunity to voice their opinion in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed stronger procedural fairness effects if the individual self is activated than if the social self is activated. It is concluded that sometimes the individual self, rather than the social self, constitutes the psychological basis for procedural fairness effects.

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## Self-construal level and procedural justice: The individual self as psychological basis for procedural fairness effects

People care deeply about the extent to which they are treated fairly by others. Indeed, it has been suggested that fairness is among the most important norms and values in human society (Folger, 1984). One of the most frequently studied conceptualizations of fairness is procedural justice, which is the extent to which people regard decision-making procedures as fair or unfair (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Accumulating research indicated that perceived procedural justice has positive effects on numerous perceptions, emotions, and behaviors in virtually all domains of social life, including organizations, education, politics, the legal arena, and close relationships (e.g., Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). One noteworthy finding is that perceived procedural justice influences social evaluations, such as people's evaluations of their relation with decision-makers. In the current article, we refer to these effects of procedural justice on relational treatment evaluations as *procedural fairness effects* (Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002).

An illustration of procedural fairness effects can be found in people's reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures: People generally rate procedures that allow them an opportunity to voice their opinions to be more fair than procedures that deny

them such an opportunity (Folger, 1977; see also Brockner et al., 1998; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). In addition, voice procedures positively influence people's evaluations of their relation with decision-making authorities. Notably, when people are granted (as opposed to denied) voice procedures, they perceive the decision-maker as more polite and respectful, and believe the decision-maker to be more objective. Such procedural fairness effects are very robust and easily generalize across methods and samples (e.g., Folger, 1977; Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1994; Van den Bos, 2003; Van Prooijen et al., 2008).

Procedural fairness effects often emerge as a result of people's personal experiences of procedural justice and injustice, that is, situations where people *themselves* were treated fairly or unfairly by decision-making authorities (e.g., Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998; Van den Bos & Lind, 2001). Hence, it is plausible that the self is involved in the justice judgment process. The self, however, is a broad construct that can operate at various levels. A common distinction of self-construal level is between the individual self and the social self. These levels of self-construal have been argued to operate relatively independent from each other (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). The individual self is the part of the self-concept that differentiates the self from others and stresses the individual's uniqueness, and the social self is the part of the self-concept that assimilates the self with others and stresses similarities with other people. As such, these levels of self-construal are closely associated with cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). Both self-conceptualizations are an integral part of people's self-concept and can be made more or less accessible through contextual factors (Brewer & Gardner, 1996;

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Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). We propose here that the precise relations between these various levels of self-construal and procedural fairness effects are as yet poorly understood. The current research investigates the influence of self-construal level on procedural fairness effects.

### Self-construal level and procedural fairness effects

Experiences of procedural justice and injustice are products of people's interactions with other people (e.g., Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2004). This social nature of procedural justice has led researchers to conclude that it is the social self that shapes procedural fairness effects. For instance, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) reasoned that "...the fairness of enacted procedures communicates information relevant to the *social self*, and, in turn, motivates group members to engage in cooperative behavior aimed at promoting the group's interest" (p. 155; italics added). Indeed, empirical research established that procedural justice leads people to support the collective interest at the expense of immediate self-interest (De Cremer, 2002). In the present contribution, however, we argue that these findings do not automatically imply that procedural fairness effects originate from concerns that are associated with the social self. Instead, we propose that in many situations procedural fairness effects are shaped by concerns that are associated with the individual self. The reason for this can be found in research findings that fair procedures are expected to produce both instrumental and social rewards. Voice procedures raise outcome expectancies (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and more importantly, voice procedures inform recipients that they are respected, have high status, and are regarded as fully-fledged members of their community (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Empirical research indeed confirms relations between procedural justice and feelings of status or belongingness (De Cremer, 2002; Tyler, 1994; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996; Van Prooijen et al., 2002, 2004).

Recipients are likely to value the rewards that are associated with procedural justice (e.g., respect, admiration) because of the positive implications for their own feelings of self-worth (Lind et al., 1998; Van Prooijen et al., 2008). Of particular importance to the present purposes, it stands to reason that people want to receive the rewards of justice for who they are, because of their own qualities, and because of their unique contributions to their community. Hence, it is plausible that the desire to obtain the rewards that are associated with procedural justice originate from the need to validate one's unique individual attributes. Furthermore, it must be noted that such validation of one's individual attributes may be particularly relevant when responding to voice procedures; after all, voice procedures imply that recipients are asked for their individual and unique input in the decision-making process. These considerations suggest that it sometimes is the individual self, and not the social self, that constitutes the psychological basis for procedural fairness effects. In correspondence with this idea, a meta-analysis by Gaertner et al. (2002) reveals that the individual self is people's primary basis for self-definition, and that the individual self is much more sensitive to external enhancements or threats than the social self. The Gaertner et al. findings fit the current propositions to the extent that voice procedures are rewarding for the individual and no-voice procedures are threatening to the individual.

If the underlying motivations which shape procedural fairness effects indeed reflect concerns that pertain to the individual self, then it is likely that people are particularly sensitive to procedural justice when the individual self is activated. Activation of the individual self may thus amplify procedural fairness effects. To inves-

tigate this hypothesis, in two experiments participants were either primed with the individual self by activating the word "I" or with the social self by activating the word "We". These priming procedures were developed in previous research, and have been shown to successfully elicit responses that are associated with the individual self versus the social self (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Furthermore, we added a control condition to our self-construal activation manipulation. This enabled us to establish in what priming condition procedural fairness effects are most strongly affected, while simultaneously allowing for comparison with related procedural justice research. Following the self-construal manipulation, we induced a manipulation of voice versus no-voice procedures within an experimental setup that has been validated in previous research (e.g., Van den Bos, 2003; Van den Bos & Lind, 2001; Van Prooijen et al., 2008). Given that our line of reasoning focuses on the implications of procedural justice for how people perceive the self in relation to others, the main dependent variables in the experiments were relational treatment evaluations, that is, evaluations of one's relation with decision-makers (e.g., Huo et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1998; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van Prooijen et al., 2002). We predicted that voice versus no-voice procedures would exert stronger effects on relational treatment evaluations among participants who were primed with the word "I" than among participants who were primed with the word "We".

### Experiment 1

#### Method

#### Participants and design

The hypothesis was tested in a 3 (self construal activation: I versus we versus control)  $\times$  2 (procedure: voice versus no-voice) factorial design. A total of 115 participants (68 men, 47 women, varying in age from 18 to 39 years) were recruited in the restaurants of the VU University Amsterdam, and were assigned randomly to conditions (18–20 participants per cell). The experiment was followed by another, unrelated experiment. Together the experiments lasted 45 min and participants were paid 5 euros for participation.

#### Procedure

Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to separate cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found computer equipment, which was used to present the stimulus information and to register the data. The experiment was introduced as a study on how people perform tasks. Participants were informed that they would perform a writing task during the experiment. Additionally, participants were led to believe that all computers in the lab were interconnected, and that the experimenter, who was supposed to be in one of the cubicles, could send messages to all participants during the experiment (in reality, all stimulus information was pre-programmed; a procedure none of the participants objected to upon debriefing). Finally, participants were informed that a lottery with a prize of 50 euros would take place, and that the experimenter would allocate a total of 200 lottery tickets among all participants. After the writing task, a number of lottery tickets would be allocated to the participant.

Participants then started with the writing task, for which they found a piece of paper and a pen next to the computer. Participants in the I condition were asked to write seven sentences about "who I am", and were instructed to use one of the following words in every sentence: I, me, my, myself, mine (Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Participants in the we condition were asked to write seven sentences about "who we are", and were instructed to use one of

the following words in every sentence: we, us, our, ourselves, ours (no specific reference group was mentioned here). Participants in the control condition were asked to write seven sentences about “watching TV”, and were instructed to use one of the following words in every sentence: program, relaxed, show, movie, commercial.

After the manipulation of self-construal activation, participants continued with the procedure manipulation. Participants in the voice condition were informed that they were allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of lottery tickets that they thought should be allocated to them. These participants were asked to type in the number of lottery tickets they thought they should receive. Participants in the no-voice condition were informed that they were not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion about the number of lottery tickets that they thought should be allocated to them. These participants were not asked to type in the number of lottery tickets they thought they should receive. All participants were then told that they would be informed about their number of lottery tickets at the end of the experiment, but that they first would be asked a number of questions. These questions pertained to the dependent measures and manipulation checks.

To measure relational treatment evaluations, we assessed the following three items (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): “How politely were you treated by the experimenter?”, “How respectful were you treated by the experimenter?”, “How partial do you believe that the experimenter is?” (recoded). These three items were averaged into a reliable relational treatment scale ( $\alpha = .74$ ). To check whether the procedure manipulation successfully manipulated varying levels of procedural justice, we measured participants’ procedural justice judgments with the following two questions: “How fair was the procedure used to divide the lottery tickets?” (1 = *very unfair*, 7 = *very fair*) and “How just was the procedure used to divide the lottery tickets? (1 = *very unjust*, 7 = *very just*). These two items were averaged into a reliable procedural justice scale ( $\alpha = .77$ ). Although the relational treatment and procedural justice scales were substantially correlated in Experiment 1 ( $r = .59$ ,  $p < .001$ ), we constructed separate scales following previous arguments that evaluations of interpersonal treatment by decision-makers, versus evaluations of the formal decision-making process, are related yet distinct aspects of the justice judgment process (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2003). For instance, Colquitt (2001) found that these types of measures, although substantially correlated, predict different types of organizational perceptions and behaviors. Hence, theoretically it makes most sense to classify these items into separate relational treatment and procedural justice scales.

To check the procedure manipulation, we asked the following two questions (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): “To what extent did the experimenter allow you an opportunity to voice your opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be allocated to you?” and “How much attention did the experimenter give to your opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be allocated to you?”. These two items were averaged into a reliable procedure check scale ( $\alpha = .87$ ). After this, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.

## Results and discussion

### Manipulation checks

The procedure manipulation was checked with  $3 \times 2$  ANOVAs. The analysis on the procedure check scale produced a significant procedure main effect only,  $F(1,109) = 326.30$ ,  $p < .001$ . Participants in the voice condition perceived more opportunities to voice their opinions ( $M = 5.47$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ) than participants in the no-voice condition ( $M = 1.60$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ). Furthermore, the analysis on the procedural justice scale produced a significant procedure

**Table 1**

Means and standard deviations of participants’ relational treatment evaluations as a function of self-activation and procedure (Experiment 1).

Procedure	Self-activation					
	I		We		Control	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Voice	5.20	0.91	4.84	0.74	5.21	1.04
No-voice	2.57	1.15	3.38	1.22	3.00	1.06

Note. Higher means indicate more positive relational treatment evaluations.

main effect only,  $F(1,109) = 38.75$ ,  $p < .001$ . Participants in the voice condition reported higher levels of perceived procedural justice ( $M = 4.95$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ) than participants in the no-voice condition ( $M = 3.13$ ,  $SD = 1.73$ ). Based on these results, it can be concluded that participants perceived the procedure manipulation as intended, and that the procedure manipulation successfully manipulated varying levels of procedural justice.

### Relational treatment evaluations

The means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 1. A  $3 \times 2$  ANOVA on relational treatment evaluations yielded a significant procedure main effect,  $F(1,109) = 118.44$ ,  $p < .001$ . More important was that this analysis also produced a significant interaction,  $F(2,109) = 3.16$ ,  $p < .05$ . To examine this interaction, we conducted a number of contrast analyses. First, we calculated an interaction contrast in which we compared the procedure effect in the I condition with the procedure effect in the we condition. This interaction contrast was significant,  $F(1,109) = 6.08$ ,  $p < .02$ . Simple main effect analyses revealed that the procedure effect was stronger in the I condition,  $F(1,109) = 60.45$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .36$ , than in the we condition,  $F(1,109) = 19.37$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .15$ . These results support the hypothesis that people respond more strongly to voice versus no-voice procedures when the individual rather than the social self is activated.

In addition, both the interaction contrasts involving the control condition were nonsignificant; for the I versus control condition,  $F < 1$ ; for the we versus control condition,  $F(1,109) = 2.71$ ,  $p > .10$ . The effect size of the procedure effect in the control condition was intermediate between the I and we conditions,  $F(1,109) = 43.87$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .29$ . Finally, it can be noted here that the effect of self-activation was nonsignificant in both the voice condition,  $F(1,109) = 1.06$ , ns, and in the no-voice condition,  $F(1,109) = 2.18$ ,  $p > .11$ . These results suggest that both the voice and no-voice conditions contributed to the emergence of an interaction.

The results of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that activation of the individual self produces stronger procedural fairness effects than activation of the social self. These findings suggest that, sometimes, the individual self rather than the social self shapes responses to decision-making procedures. To provide further evidence for our hypothesis, we conducted a second experiment in which we used a different manipulation of self-construal activation.

## Experiment 2

### Method

#### Participants and design

We again tested the hypotheses in a  $3$  (self-activation: I versus we versus control)  $\times 2$  (procedure: voice versus no-voice) factorial design. Participants were recruited in the student restaurants of the VU University Amsterdam, leading to a total of 106 participants (38 men, 68 women), varying in age from 18 to 55 years. Partici-



pants were again assigned randomly to conditions (17 or 18 participants per cell). The experiment was followed by four unrelated other experiments. The experiments lasted a total of 45 minutes, and participants were paid 5 euros for participation.

### Procedure

The introduction was identical to Experiment 1, with the difference that (instead of a writing task) participants would conduct a reading task. Following the introduction of the lottery ticket allocation, participants started with the reading task, which contained the manipulation of self-activation. Participants read a text about a trip to the city. In the “I” condition, this text was written in the first person singular (e.g., “I love the city. To me, the city is a place to enjoy. . .”). In the “we” condition, the text was written in the first person plural (e.g., “We love the city. To us, the city is a place to enjoy. . .”). In both these conditions, participants were instructed to count and indicate the total number of personal pronouns in the text (both conditions contained an equal amount of personal pronouns). In the control condition, all personal pronouns in the text were replaced by a string of letters (ABC or XYZ) or by the word “it”, and participants were instructed to count and indicate the total number of times these words appeared in the text (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001).<sup>1</sup>

The manipulation of procedure was then administered to the participants. This procedure manipulation was identical to the procedure manipulation of Experiment 1. After this, we measured participants' relational treatment evaluations with the following two questions (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*): “How politely were you treated by the experimenter?” and “To what extent did the experimenter respect you?”. These two items were averaged into a reliable relational treatment scale ( $\alpha = .72$ ). To measure procedural justice judgments, we asked the same two questions as in Experiment 2 and averaged them into a reliable procedural justice scale ( $\alpha = .84$ ). The relational treatment and procedural justice scales were again positively correlated ( $r = .36$ ,  $p < .001$ ). To check the procedure manipulation, we asked the same two questions as in Experiment 2 and averaged them into a reliable procedure check scale ( $\alpha = .86$ ). Participants were then debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.

### Results and discussion

#### Manipulation checks

The procedure manipulation was again checked with  $3 \times 2$  ANOVAs. The analysis on the procedure check scale yielded a significant procedure main effect only,  $F(1,100) = 82.59$ ,  $p < .001$ . Participants in the voice condition perceived more opportunities to voice their opinions ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 1.61$ ) than participants in the no-voice condition ( $M = 1.94$ ,  $SD = 1.61$ ). Furthermore, the analysis on the procedural justice scale indicated a significant procedure main effect only,  $F(1,100) = 12.33$ ,  $p < .002$ . Participants in the voice condition reported higher levels of perceived procedural justice ( $M = 4.81$ ,  $SD = 1.70$ ) than participants in the no-voice condition ( $M = 3.63$ ,  $SD = 1.72$ ). These results suggest that participants perceived the procedure manipulation as intended, and that the procedure manipulation successfully manipulated varying levels of perceived procedural justice.

#### Relational treatment evaluations

The means and standard deviations on relational treatment evaluations are displayed in Table 2. A  $3 \times 2$  ANOVA on relational

**Table 2**

Means and standard deviations of participants' relational treatment evaluations as a function of self-activation and procedure (Experiment 2).

Procedure	Self-activation					
	I		We		Control	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Voice	5.63	0.99	4.75	1.02	5.38	1.44
No-voice	2.68	0.92	2.97	1.05	3.79	1.70

Note. Higher means indicate more positive relational treatment evaluations.

treatment evaluations produced a significant procedure main effect,  $F(1,100) = 79.76$ ,  $p < .001$ , and a significant self-construal activation main effect,  $F(2,100) = 3.23$ ,  $p < .05$ . More important was that this analysis also revealed a significant interaction,  $F(2,100) = 3.27$ ,  $p < .05$ . In correspondence with Experiment 1, we calculated the interaction contrast of the procedure effect in the I condition versus the procedure effect in the we condition. This interaction contrast was significant,  $F(1,100) = 4.05$ ,  $p < .05$ . The procedure simple main effect was stronger in the I condition,  $F(1,100) = 51.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .34$ , than in the we condition,  $F(1,100) = 19.21$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .16$ . This finding provides further support for the hypothesis that people display stronger procedural fairness effects if the individual self is activated than if the social self is activated.

Furthermore, the procedure effect in the we condition did not differ significantly from the procedure effect in the control condition,  $F < 1$ . However, the interaction contrast comparing the procedure effect in the I versus control conditions was significant,  $F(1,100) = 5.52$ ,  $p < .03$ . The procedure simple main effect in the I condition was significantly stronger than the procedure simple main effect in the control condition,  $F(1,100) = 15.44$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = .13$ . It can further be noted here that the effect of self-activation approached significance in the voice condition,  $F(2,100) = 2.55$ ,  $p < .09$ , and was significant in the no-voice condition,  $F(2,100) = 4.00$ ,  $p < .03$ . These results suggest that both the voice and no-voice conditions contributed to the emergence of an interaction.

### General discussion

The two experiments reported in this article converge on the finding that activation of the individual self produces stronger procedural fairness effects than activation of the social self. This finding was corroborated with two manipulations of self-construal activation (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). These results support the hypothesis that sometimes the individual self, instead of the social self, shapes procedural fairness effects. The findings are congruent with theoretical arguments that procedural fairness effects originate from a desire to obtain either instrumental or social rewards (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992), and that these rewards reflect concerns that pertain to the individual self given that people associate them with their own self-worth (Gaertner et al., 2002).

The current research sought to point out that procedural fairness effects are not always shaped by the social self, as has been argued by various researchers (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003). The idea that procedural fairness effects relate to the social self is based on previous empirical findings which revealed that an increased connectedness with the social environment produces stronger procedural fairness effects (Huo et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1998; Van Prooijen et al., 2004). How can the present findings be reconciled with these previous findings? Two matters are relevant in response to this question. First, a strong connectedness with the social world does not automatically mean

<sup>1</sup> We thank Diederik Stapel for generously sharing the stimulus materials of the study in which he induced this manipulation (Stapel & Koomen, 2001; Exp. 1).

that the social self is activated. In fact, the results of Gaertner et al.'s (2002) meta-analysis revealed that the individual self is people's primary basis for self-definition both among people who identify strongly or weakly with a social group, and in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Moreover, it has been noted that specific personal factors—which presumably are associated with the individual self—can shape identification. For instance, Hogg (2007) proposed that personal uncertainty—an individual factor that also has been related with procedural fairness effects (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002)—can motivate identification with social groups. Hence, high identification does not necessarily originate from factors that are associated with the social self only.

Second, it is noteworthy that the present self-construal primes only address the cognitive component of identification, without referring to a specific group. When a specific group membership is at stake, also affective considerations (e.g., how happy is one to be member of a particular group) are likely to contribute to procedural justice reasoning. Indeed, it has been noted that procedural justice has a positive influence both on factors that pertain to a member's unique place within a group (e.g., the respect that one is accorded as a group member) as well as on factors that bind various group members together as a collective (e.g., the extent to which one feels pride in the group; Tyler et al., 1996). This suggests that procedural justice is in flexible ways associated with self-construal levels, producing shifts toward the individual self when within-group comparisons are salient and producing shifts toward the social self when between-group comparisons are salient (cf. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

To further elaborate on this latter suggestion, the current research was explicitly focused on justice and injustice that targets a specific individual. This focus on how a specific individual is treated by others is in correspondence with the majority of procedural justice research (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). Justice and injustice can also target social groups, however, as for example is the case in group-based fraternal deprivation (i.e., unfair resource deprivation of one's social group in comparison to another social group; Crosby, 1982), or political decision-making where decisions influence a large group of people (Leung, Tong, & Lind, 2007). It may be the case that people are most sensitive to group-level injustices when the social self is activated (cf. Smith & Spears, 1996). After all, group-level injustices often involve intergroup comparisons, and intergroup comparisons are likely to produce shifts in self-definition toward the social self (Gaertner et al., 2002; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Preliminary evidence for this idea was found in two studies by Kemmelmeier (2003), in which participants were more supportive of affirmative action policies following social self-activation than following individual self-activation. These findings, in conjunction with the findings obtained in the present study, suggest that there may be a congruency between the target of injustice (the individual versus the group) and the level of self-construal that drives justice concerns (the individual versus social self). Such congruency between self-construal activation and the target of injustice may provide fruitful avenues for further study.

On a broader theoretical level, the present ideas are consistent with previous arguments that the individual self is quite social, and that both the individual and social self are functional in the regulation of social relationships. For example, Gaertner et al. (2002) noted that "A most critical function of the social group is to act as a protective mechanism that serves the needs of the individual" (p. 586) (see also Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). Furthermore, Baumeister and Leary (1995) argued that the need to belong ultimately is an individual need, comparable to other basic human needs like food and safety. This latter idea

is supported by findings that, in most cases, deprivation of belongingness needs harms the individual, and not necessarily the group (McDonald & Leary, 2005). Of course, individual satisfaction or dissatisfaction of belongingness needs do have subsequent implications for group-oriented behaviors such as cooperation (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2005), which in turn may provide advantages to groups during between-group competitions (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). These group-level implications of individual needs suggest a dynamic interplay between various levels of self-construal and the surrounding social world, and confirm that both the individual and social self are integral aspects of people's self-concept that are applied flexibly to regulate social relationships.

In closing, although information about fairness is generally regarded as "social"—in that situations which elicit fairness judgments generally involve at least some kind of interaction—the present research sought to illuminate that the reasons why people care about fairness can sometimes be found in their concern for individuality and uniqueness. Even though procedural justice may communicate rewards that are considered social because they are generally provided by others (respect, status; Tyler, 1994), these social rewards nevertheless have implications for an individual's self-worth and the value that people attach to their individual attributes. Informed by the present findings, it can be concluded that in situations where a specific person is targeted by voice or no-voice procedures, it is the individual self rather than the social self which constitutes the psychological basis for procedural fairness effects.

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